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The paper reports the results of an empirical study of the price relation between
the German Performance Stock Index, DAX, and DAX futures. An ex-ante
arbitrage strategy based on arbitrage signals is analyzed. The data set contains
intraday bid- and ask futures quotes and index values on a minute by minute
basis. Itis found that the numberand persistence ofarbitrage opportunities differs
considerably for futures nearest to deliver as compared to futures which are not
nearest to deliver. The findings suggest that arbitrageurs trade mainly in futures
nearest to deliver. The risk associated with arbitrage trading is found to be very
small so that arbitrage profits are nearly risk free.
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Since the introduction ofstock index futures in US-markets in 1992, researchers and
practitioners have been interested in the relationship between index futures prices
and the underlying stock indices. Inparticular, two questions have been raised. First,
can the price relation be described by the cost-of-carry model? Second, do prices in
one market lead those ofthe other market? This paper-contributes to the fIrst line of
research using a new data set for the German stock index, DAX, and related DAX
futures. The second question is not pursued in this paper~ but for an analysis see, for
example, Stoll/Whaley (1990) and Chan (1992) for US-markets and
GIiinbichler/Lbngstaff/Schwartz (1992) and KempfIKaehler (1993) for German
markets.
The existence of mispriced futures contracts has been documented at length for
American, English, and Japanese markets. Many previous studies report significant
differences between obselVed stock index futures prices and theoretical futures
prices derived from the cost-of-carry model.l Most of these studies also determine
ex post arbitrage opportunities by computing the difference between the absolute
value ofthe mispricing and the round trip transaction costs. Thus, these studies test
whether arbitrageurs trading instantaneously can earn arbitrage profIts. In addition,
ex ante arbitrage studies typically take into account the fact that arbitrageurs undergo
an execution lag. This leads to orders which are executed at prices differing, in
general, from the prices which originally indicated arbitrage opportunities. From this
viewpoint arbitrage trading is risky and the arbitrage profits are uncertain.
In previous studies of ex ante arbitrage strategies, such as Yadav/Pope (1990),
Chung (1991), and Klemkosky/I..ee (1991), itis assumed that arbitrageurs place their
orders as soon as an ex post arbitrage opportunity is obselVed, i.e. as soon as the
mispricing is larger than the round trip transaction costs. This implies that the risk
associated with the prderexecution lag is not considered in the trading strategy ofan
arbitrageur. However, these studies find that there is considerable risk resulting from
1 See for example Cornell/French (1983a, 1983b), Modest/Sundaresan (1983), Figlewski
(1984a, 1984b), MacKinley!Ramaswamy (1988), Brenner/Subrarunanyam!Uno (1989,
1990), Bhatt/Cakici (1990), Stull/Wasserfallen/Stucki (1990), YadavlPope (1990, 1992),
Chung (1991), Klemkosky/Lee (1991), Puttonen/Martikainen (1991), Lim (1992), and
Puttonen (1993).
1this execution lag. Consequently, ex ante arbitrage profits are substantially smaller
than those indicated by ex post arbitrage opportunities.
In this study, ex ante arbitrage opportunities are reexamined. The paper differs from
the related papers ofYadav!Pope (1990), Chung (1991), and KlemkoskylLee (1991)
in three main respects. First, a different arbitrage strategy is investigated. Based on
interviews with arbitrage traders that were carried out for this
r study, it is not
assumed that arbitrageurs open arbitrage positions whenever an ex post arbitrage
opportunity is observed. Instead, it is assumed that arbitrageurs require a risk
premium to cover the execution risk they bear. Second, arbitrage profits are not
measured relative to different, somewhat arbitrary, levels of transaction costs. Here,
the arbitrage profits of a low cost arbitrageur are determined. Finally and most
importantly, the German stock index, DAX, and its associated futures are studied.
Although the German stock and futures markets are among the largest in the world
and the Dax index differs in several important respects from other well-known stock
indices, the existence of arbitrage profits in these markets has received relativeley
little attention. Hohmann (1991), Loistl/Kobinger (1992), and Prigge/Schlag (1992)
analyze the mispricing ofDax futures and the related ex post arbitrage opportunities,
whereas Bamberg/Roder (1994) focus on the impact of, taxes on arbitrage
opportunities. Gnmbichler/Callahan (1993) analyze ex ante arbitrage profits,
restricting themselves to the rare case ofovervalued futures.
There are three specific features which lead to a relatively low level of risk
associated with ex ante arbitrage strategies in German markets as compared with
other markets. First, unlike other well-known stock indices, e.g. S&P 500, FfSE-
100, and Nikkei 225, the DAX index measures the total performance of the
underlying stock portfolio. As a consequence ofthis performance feature, there is no
dividend risk for arbitrageurs. Second, the DAX index is narrow, consisting of only
30 blue chips ofthe German stock market which represent about 60% ofthe market
capitalization and 85% ofthe trade volume. Therefore, arbitrageurs are able to trade
a perfect matching basket at reasonable costs and in a reasonable span of time.
Consequently, the tracking error risk can be avoided and the execution risk is
relatively low. Third, there is no execution risk in the futures market as the German
Futures and Options Exchange (DTB) is an electronic screen-trading market. Based
on these specific features of the German markets, one would expect that arbitrage
2opportunities will be exploited very quickly, and that ex ante arbitrage strategies are
nearly risk free. As a result, the price relation between stock and futures markets
should not allow for large and long lasting arbitrage opportunities.
This hypothesis is studied using a new data set which includes all time stamped bid
and ask quotes in the futures market and the value ofthe DAX index on a minute by
minute basis. As with nearly all studies cited above, a "conservative" cash and carry
arbitrage strategy is modelled. All arbitrage positions are held until the maturity of
the futures contracts. Neither rolling over nor early unwinding of arbitrage positions
is considered.2 An arbitrageur using these more sophisticated strategies may open
arbitrage positions even when a cost of carry arbitrageur would not. This behavior
may be rational, because he receives the potentially valuable options to unwind or to
rollover his positions at lower costs in the future.3
The remainder ofthis paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the trading
mechanism for DAX futures and stocks. Section 3 reviews the valuation theory of
stock index futures and transforms it to DAX futures. The data set used in the study
is described in Section 4. Section 5 tests whether the price.-relation between DAX
and DAX futures can be described by the cost-of-carry model. The results ofthe ex
ante arbitrage study are detailed in Section 6. Briefly, the main results,summarized in
Section 7, are as follows: Futures contracts at the German Futures and Options
Exchange are significantly undervalued. The absolute value of the udervaluation
increases in all contracts with time to maturity. There is a large- number of arbitrage
signals - most indicating short-arbitrage opportunities. The arbitrage strategies used
by arbitrageurs are profitable in more then 95% of all cases, even ifexecution lags
up to 5 minutes are assumed. Arbitrage profits are lowest when trading in futures
nearest to delivery. If arbitrageurs are assumed to determine the mispricing, this
result suggets that they concentrate their trading onfutures nearest to delivery.
2
3
Empirical studies in which these strategies are considered include Merrik (1989),
Yadav/Pope (1990), and Sofianos (1993). They provide evidence that unwinding is a
strategy heavily used and that it accounts for an important part ofthe total arbitrage profit.
See Brennan/Schwartz (1988; 1990), Cooper/Mello (1990), and Biihler/Kempf(1994) for
pricing models ofthe early unwind option included in arbitrage positions.
3..2. Institutional Settings
In tenns ofmarket capitalization, the Gennan stock market is the fifth largest in the
world. At the end of 1992, its marKet capitalization was 562 billion Deutsch Marks
(DM), Le. about 351 billion US Dollars.4 In tenns of ~dingvolume relative to the
market capitalization, the Gennan stock market is the most active market in Europe
and one ofthe most active markets in the world. In 1992, the turnover ratio was 119
% in the German stock market compared to 42 % at the New York Stock Exchange
and 34 % in the UK market. Within the Gennan stock market, about 85 % oftrading
consists ofstocks included in the DAX index.
The DAX index comprises 30 Gennan stocks selected according to market
capitalization, turnover, and availability ofearly opening prices. The DAX index is a
capital-weighted perfonnance index which is adjusted for price changes caused by
subscription rights, stock splits, and dividends. Most of the well-known stock
indices are corrected for subscription rights and stock splits etc. while the
adjustment procedure for dividend payments is a specific feature of the DAX. The
adjustment for dividends is obtained by reinvesting the total amount of dividend
payments into the dividend paying stock. This means that with ,a dividend payment,
the total shares of stock in the portfolio underlying the DAX index increases, while
its total value remains unchanged.
The DAX index is calculated at an accuracy of 0.01 index points based on
transaction prices of the underlying stocks. The Frankfurt Stock Exchange from
which the index data are obtained is the largest of the 8 regional German stock
exchanges, accounting for about two thirds of total trading volume. The DAX is
calculated as soon as at least 16 of the underlying stocks have been traded. As a
result, at the beginning of a trading day, the index may include up to 14 prices
resulting from transactions from the previous day. However,
GronbichlerlLongstafflSchwartz (1992) report that, on average, trading in stocks
included in the DAX starts within four minutes. This suggests· that the problem of
including overnight prices occurs only at the very beginning ofa trading day. During
trading hours the index is calculated every minute based on the latest transaction
4 For the calculation ofthe US Dollar amounts, an exchange rate of 1.6 Deutsch Marks per
US Dollar is assumed throughout
4price of ~ach stock reported by official brokers via a real time price information
system. Official brokers are obliged to transmit transaction prices immediately, so
that there is essentially no time difference between a new price and its inclusion in
the index.
There are three groups of traders at the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. First, there are
employees ofbanks trading on ~e bank's or on a customer's account. Second, there
are floor brokers who trade for their own account and are permitted to trade
whatever they want, but generally specialize in certain market segments. For
example, there are floor brokers who provide quotes for trading stock baskets
reflecting the DAX index. Third, there are official brokers who provide a continuous
auction in the most liquid stocks as well as a noon auction in all stocks. Official
brokers also run limit order books. Unlike floor traders, official brokers are legally
restricted in trading on their own account. They are appointed by the government
and paid by a fixed brokerage fee of0.06 % ofthe trade volume. Official brokers do
not set up bid and ask quotes, but they match the orders submitted by banks and
floor brokers.
Index arbitrage trading in the spot'market is usually carried out by banks in the
following way. As soon as an arbitrage opportunity is perceived, several employees
ofthe bank located at the exchange rush to official brokers assigned to the stocks to
be traded, or to a single floor broker specialized in trading baskets. In general, the
stock market transactions are carried out within about o~e or two minutes.
Arbitrageurs are able to sell stocks short by borrowing them from an in-house
securities lending desk or from an institution called "Deutsche Kassenverein." They
are charged a time dependent lending fee, but the proceeds of short sales can be
invested. Securities transactions ofbanks are delivered by crediting or debiting their
accounts kept at the Deutsche Kassenverein. A transaction fee of0.7 DM per trade
is charged by this institution, independentofthe size ofthe trade.
The second part of the index arbitrage trading consists of buying or selling DAX
futures. DAX futures are screen traded at the German Futures and Options Exchange
(DTB). The DTB runs a fully automated trading system combining quotation,
trading, clearing, and settlement. The system is open from 7:30 AM to 5:00 PM
where each trading day consists of a pre-trading period, an opening period, a
continuous trading period, and a post-trading period. During the pre- and post-
5trading period orders are placed into the market, but no trading takes place. The
opening period consists of a pre-opening period during which indicative prices are
provided and then a single opening auction where the price is set to maximize
turnover. The trading period ranges from 9:30 AM to 4:00 PM, so that there is
futures trading before the floor opens and after the floor closes. In terms of trading
volume, the DTB was the fifth largest index futu~s exchange in the world in 1992,
with about 13,000 index futures contracts traded per day. More than 80 percent of
these trades concentrate on the futures contract with the shortest time to maturity.
Each OAXfutures contract has a volume of 100 OM perindex point. Given an index
value of1600, this leads to a contract size of$100,000. The minimal price change in
OAX futures is 0.5 index points - a tick size of50 DM.
The index futures market is a dealer market with voluntary market makers providing
liquidity for the market. Alongside market makers, regular market participants trade
on their own or customers' accounts. Each trader submits orders via his trading
tenninal to the exchUlge where the orders are matched automatically based on price
and time priority. On the trading screen ofa trader, prices and quantities of bid and
ask quotes, the last transaction price, and the value ofthe DAX index are displayed.
Thus, an arbitrageur can immediately calculate the mispricing of a futures contract
and build up the desired futures position at known bid or ask prices. As an
arbitrageurplaces his orderby pressing a button onhis computer, there is essentially
no order execution lag in the futures market. One way trading costs in the index
futures markets are 4 OM per contract which equals about 0.0025 % of the contract
volume.
3. Valuation ofDAXFutures
The standard approach ofpricing stock index futures, the cost-of-carry model, rests
on the following assumptions: First, all markets where arbitrag~urs trade are free of
restrictions, i.e. there are no transaction costs, assets can be perfectly divided,
interest rates for lending and borrowing are equal, orders are executed
instantaneously, andthere are no tax effects. Second, arbitrageurs prefermore to less
and are not restricted in the size oftheir arbitrage positions.-Third, interest rates are
6non-stochastic so that futures can be treated as forward contracts., Fourth, all
dividend payments from the underlying stock portfolio occurring until maturity ofthe
futures contract are known. Given all of these assumptions, it is well-known that
arbitrageurs will insure that the following no arbitrage relation holds.
J
(1) F(t,T) = I(t)eT(r.T)[T-t] - LD(tj)eTCtj;T\T-tj],
j=l
where F(t,T) is the price of the index future at time t with maturity at time T. I(t)
denotes the value of the stock index at time t, r(t,T) the interest rate per year for
borrowing or lending money for the period of time [t,T], and T-t is the time to
maturity ofthe futures contract. D(tj )/(tj,Tl[r-tj] denotes the dividend payment at time
t j compounded to the maturity date T ofthe future.
Among other things, it is'essential in deriving equation (1) that ~itrageurs know at
time t all future dividend payments resulting from their stock positions until time T
when the futures contract matures. This assumption of known dividend payments
can be relaxed when valuing DAX futures. As pointed out above, the DAX is a
perfonnance index which measures the total perfonnance of the underlying stock
portfolio. It is adjusted for stock price changes caused by subscription rights, stock
splits, and dividend payments.5 This adjustment is achieve,d, for example, by
reinvesting dividend payments into the dividend paying stock and rebalancing the
portfolio once a year.6 So, the increasing number of total shares of stocks in the
portfolio couterbalances exactly the decrease in the stock price. so that the total
value ofthe index portfolio and the index itselfare unchanged by dividends.
As a consequence of this index correction, DAX futures relate to an augmented
stock portfolio and an arbitrageur has to follow the index reinvestment strategy to
avoid unbalanced arbitrage positions. If the arbitrageur reinvests the dividend
5
6
In the following, the index adjusbnent for dividend payments is discussed as dividend
payments occur much more often than subscription rights and stock splits. The adjustments
in the latter cases follow in a straightforward manner the procedure in the case of
dividends.
In order to avoid an impact of dividends onto the weightening of the index, there is a
second index correction once a year in September. This correction assumes implicitely that
all stocks purchased during the last year are sold and the proceeds are reinvested into the
stock portfolio according to the original weightening scheme.
7payment into the dividend paying stocks and rebalances his portfolio once a year, his
stock portfolio increases in the same way as the index does and it can be shown that
it exactly cancels out the obligation caused by the futures contract at maturity.
Therefore, the no arbitrage relation between DAX index and DAX futures does not
depend on dividend payments and can be written as: (
(2) F(t,T) = DAX (t)e,(t,T>{T-t].
Note that the arbitrage profits only depend on variables known at time t. In
particular, they are independent of the level of dividend payments and the point of
time when dividends are paid. Therefore, the arbitrageur reinvesting in the way
described above, runs no dividend risk.
It is essential for this result that the reinvestment of dividends increases the
arbitrageur's portfolio by the same number of shares of stocks as with the DAX
portfolio. This condition will always be met when there are no tax effects yielding to
different dividend payments and when the investor can reinvest the dividend
payment instantaneously. Both requirements are covered by the standard
assumptions ofthe cash and carry model, as described above.
However, in real markets, dividends may have an impact on the fair DAX futures
price if arbitrageurs have to pay taxes, and if they take tax payments into
considerationintheirtrading decisions. Inthis papertax effects are neglected for two
reasons. First, it can be safely assumed that arbitrage positions are mainly taken by
institutional investors which are taxed according to the German tax laws. Depending
ontheir payoutpolicy, profits ofthese investors are taxed by a tax rate between 36%
and56%.Ifthe profits and losses from arbitrage operations have a full impact on the
dividends then the relevant tax rate is 36%. As a result, in this case there will be no
tax effects, since this tax rate is implicitely applied on dividen~s when the DAX is
computed7 Second;ifthere exist several groups ofarbitrageurs differing in their tax
rates, this will result in a tax clientele effect, as the cost ofcarry value ofa futures
7 The DAX index is adjusted for 64% of the gross dividend. Thus, it is assumed that tax
burden ofa gross dividend equals 36 % which is exactly the tax rate for distributed profits
ofGennan companies.
8contract differs for each group.8 Thus, the relation between the spot and futures
price has to be detennined in an equilibrium setup. This is beyond the scope ofthis
paper.
In section 5 price differences between the obsetvedfutures prices, F(t,T), and the
arbitrage free futures price F (t,T) are analyzed. The present value ofthat difference
in relation to the index value is denoted as relative mispricing:
(3)
e-r(I.T>[T-I][F(t T)-F(t T)] e-r(I.T~T-I]F(tT)-DAX (t)
RMIS(t,T)= " *100 ' *100
DAX (t) DAX (t)
A positive mispricing is called an ovetvaluation and a negative mispncmg an
undetvaluation of the futures contract. Without transaction costs, an ovetvaluation
leads to long arbitrage positions (stocks long, futures short), and an undetvaluation
results in short arbitrage trading (stocks short, futures long). Under real conditions,
arbitrageurs have to take transaction costs into consideration so that not every
mispricing will yield arbitrage profits. In this paper, the tenn mispricing always
refers to differences between the futures price obsetved and the fair price developed
under the assumptions stated above, whereas the tenn arbitrage is used only when
market imperfections are considered as well.
4. Data
The interest rates and DAX futures data are supplied by the Deutsche
Finanzdatenbank, Karlsruhe and Mannheim, and the DAX'index data by the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange.
The study covers the tUne period between the first trading day in stock index futures
(Nov 23, 1990) and the expiration day of the DEC92 stock index future (Dec 17,
1992). At the DTB, four DAX futures with maturities at the third Friday of March,
June, September and December are established, while only the'three contracts with
8 The impact of dividend taxation on the fair futures value is discussed in detail in
Kempf/Spengel (1993) and Bamberg/ROder(l993).
9the shortest time to maturity are traded. Thus, eleven contracts are traded during the
research period, although three of them are not studied. The futures contract with
maturity in December 1990 (DEC90) is not included in the sample because of its
very short time to maturity when trading started. The contracts with maturities in
March 1993 (MAR93) and June 1993 (JUN93) are omitted, because the data set
does not cover their expiration dates.
The futures data set consists of about 6 million data records including transaction
prices, quotes, trading volume, and time recorded in seconds. As the data records are
real time stamped, the time differences between two subsequent records vary.
The DAX index is calculated every minute. The data set contains 93,336 values of
the DAX index, but unlike Chung (1991), it does not include the prices of the
underlying stocks. The DAX index is calculated from about 10:30 AM to 1:30 PM.
In order to exclude index values based partly on stock prices from the previous
trading day, the period of time from 10:30 AM to 10:45 AM is excluded from the
data set.
The data set ofinterest rates consists ofdaily bid and ask interbank interest rates for
overnight, one month, three month, six month and twelve month money. For the
pricing of a futures contract, the two interest rates which match the maturity of the
futures contractbest are interpolated linearly. Incalculating the mispricing series, the
median bid and ask quotation is used, while the relevant bid or ask quote is
considered when analyzing arbitrage opportunities.
For calculating a mispricing series, it is necessary to use simultaneous prices from
the spot and futures market. In this study, almost time simultaneous pairs of prices
are obtained as follows. To every value of the DAX index, the immediately
preceding bid and ask quotes of the futures contract consider~d are assigned. An
investor can trade on this quotes as long as they are not changed. From these time
series of price pairs, those are deleted for which the time difference between the
index value and the futures quotes is longer than one minute. Without reducing the
number of observations in the way described, there would be pairs of prices in the
sample where the same futures quotes are assigned to several index values. In that
case, one mispriced future would possibly indicate several misp~cings and arbitrage
opportunities. As a result of the matching procedure for a given futures contract,
10both the values of the index and the futures prices in two pairs of prices will be
different. The average time difference between an index value and a futures price
matched into one pair ranges from 17 seconds to 20 seconds for different futures
contracts. The numberofprice pairs obtained for each futures contract in this way is
shown in Table 1.
5. Mispricing Series
The relative mispricing of futures contracts is calculated according to equation (3)
using the mean of the current bid-ask-quotes for futures contracts and interest rates
of matching maturities. Futures prices and DAX values are paired as described in
section 4. Ifthe cost-of-carry model describes the data well, the average mispricing
should not significantly differ from zero.
Table I provides summary statistics for each contract separately. The results are
shown for total time to maturity and for the period oftime during which each futures
contract is nearest to delivery. On average, 38 percent of all pairs of prices occur
during the later subperiod
The average size ofmispricing is significantly9 different from zero for each contract
and each period, thus providing strong evidence against the hypothesis that the price
relation between DAX index and DAX futures can be described by the cost-of-carry
model. For total time to maturity, all futures show a significant average
undelValuation between -0.46 and -1.18 percent. During the subperiod when the
futures are nearest to deliver the mispricing is closer to zero, but still negative and
significant In this period the average mispricing ranges from -0.04 to -0.49 percent.
Inall contracts, the absolute size ofmispricing is smaller in the latter subperiod than
for total time to maturity. '.
9 As there is considerable autocorrelation in the mispricing series, all significance tests are
carried out using the standard errors obtained by the method ofNewey!West (1987) which
allows for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the data. The size ofautocorrelation is
shown for lag I and lag 10 in table I.
11Table I: Descriptive Statistics onRelative Mispricing Series: Total Time to Maturity / Futures Nearest to Delivery
RMIS(tT) T=03/91 T=06/91 T=09/91 T = 12/91 T =03/92 T =06/92 T = 09/92 T =12/92
n 10231/7625 19493/9373 24991/8386 24627/7513 22113/6933 20425/6476 21934/8945 24477 / 9415
Mean(% ) -0.63*/-0.47* -1.13*/-0.49* -1.18*/-0.29* -0.95*/-0.26* -0.86*/-0.29* -0.91*/-0.24* -0.68"'/-0.04* -0.46*/-0.07*
SDV (%) 0.54/0.52 0.80/0.30 0.93/0.24 0.63/0.16 0.)1/0.24 0.56/0.26 0.66/0.13 0.53/0.17
<0 8896/6290 18701 /8582 24129/7525 24200/7089 20833/5654 18988/5039 18100 / 5111 20635/5597
>0 1330/1330 789/788 857/856 423/420 1274/1273 1435/1435 3815/3815 3837/3813
=0 5/5 3/3 5/5 4/4 6/6 2/2 19/19 5/5
UVratio 6.7/4.7 23.7/10.9 28.2/8.8 57.2/16.9 16.4 / 4.4 13.2/3.5 4.7/1.3 5.4 /1.5
AC(!) 0.99/0.99 1.00 /1.00 1.00/1.00 1.00/1.00 1.00 /1.00 too /1.00 1.00/1.00 1.00/1.00
AC(0) 0.96/0.96 0.99/0.99 0.99/0.99 0.99/0.99 0.98/0.98 0.99/0.99 0.99/0.99 0.98/0.98
.1 Mean*10
3 0.07/0.21 0.06/0.07 0.14/0.07 0.07/0.06 0.08/0.10 0.08/0.04 0.07/0.04 0.07/0.01
.1 AC (1) -0.26 / -0.26 -0.23 / -0.23 -0.22 / -0.22 -0.17 / -0.17 -0.17/-0.17 -0.18/-0.18 -0.13 / -0.13 -0.08 / -0.08











Relative mispricing as defined in equation (3);
Maturity ofthe futures contract;
Number ofobservations;
Standard deviation of mispricings;
Number ofundervalued/overvalued/fair valued futures;
Number ofundervalued futures relative to the number ofovervalued futures;
Autocorrelation oforder i;
Average offirst differences in mispricing (%);
Autocorrelation oforder i in first differences;
Significant at the 0.1 percent level;Comparing the average mispricing of different futures contracts shows that the size
of mispricing is in general closer to zero in later contracts than in earlier contracts.
This is true for total time ofmaturity as well as for futures nearest to delivery. Over
time, the observed price relation approaches the fair price relation determined by the
cost ofcarry model.
In terms of numbers, Table I shows that futures are mostly undervalued. At
maximum, in the contract DEC91 only about one out of 58 mispriced futures is
overvalued. That relation decreases to about one out of 18 when the future is the
contract nearest to delivery. By the end of 1992, the undervaluation ratio approaches
but stays consistently above one. Furthermore, overvaluation occurs in almost all
cases only in futures nearest to delivery.
Remarkable is the high degree of autocorrelation in the time series of mispricing.
The last three lines of Table I show results for first differences in mispricing. On
average, they are not significantly different from zero. The autocorrelation in these
differences is slightly negative at lag 1 and is close to zero at lag 10. This indicates,
in combination with persistent high autocorrelations in levels, that mispricing is a
non-stationary variable.
This non-stationarity may result from a time dependent trend, in mispricing. One
possible explanation may be time dependent holding costs which are not considered
in formula (3). One might think about the costs of lending stocks which have to be
considered in Germany, when a short arbitrage position is opened. This leads to an
asymmetric, no-arbitrage window, so that the undervaluation.may increase with time
to maturity without allowing for arbitrage profits.
Another explanation for a time dependent trend in mispricing is given by
Comell/French (1983a, 1983b). They suggest that there is a tax timing option in spot
markets which is not available in futures markets. They conclude that futures should
be undervalued compared to the cost-of-carry model, Le. there should be a negative
mispricing, and that the absolute size ofundervaluation should increase with time to
maturity. To test this hypothesis a simple linear regressions ofthe following type are
run for eachfutures contract separately:
(4) RM/SA(t,T)=a+b*(T-t)+£
13TableD: Sununary Statistics ofLinear Regressions on Time to Maturity
Contract T=03191 T=06191 T=09191 T=12191 T=03192 T=06/92 T=09/92 T=12/92
n 72 136 180 186 173 168 171 180
a*l00 10.0 11.3 34.3*** 11.8 -1.1 4.8 30.6*** 32.8**
b*l00 -1.3* -1.2* - 1.1* -0.8* -'16* -0.7* -0.8* -0.6*







Coefficient oftime to maturity;
Maturity ofthe future contract;
Goodness-of-fit statistic;
Significant at the 0.1/1/5 percent level;where RMISA(t,T) equals the average relative mispricing ofone day and (T-t) equals
time to maturity in days. The existence of a tax timing option suggests that the
parameter a should be zero and the parameter b should be negative.
The results of these regressions, reported in Table II, strongly reject the hypothesis
that the mispricing does not depend on time to maturity. It can be concluded from
Table II that futu'res are the more undervalued, the longer their time to maturity is.
This result holds for all futures under investigation. The results concerning the
parameter b support the existence of a valuable tax timing options in the spot
instrument which is not available in futures contracts. 3 ofthe 8 regressions lead to a
significantly positive constant a which cannot be explained by a tax timing option.
This suggests that there may be other unidentified variables influencing the
mispncing. The explanatory power of the regression is fairly high in all contracts. In
Figure 1, a typical fonn of this relation is drawn using data of the futures contract
maturing in June 1991.





The results presented here are similar to the findings in other markets. An
undervaluation ofstock index futures is, for example, reported by Figlewski (1984a,
1984b) and MacKinlaylRamaswamy (1988) for US markets, by Bren-
15ner/SubrahmanyamlUno (1989, 1990) and Lim (1992) for Japanese markets, by
Yadav/Pope (1990) for UK markets, by Stulz/Wasserfallen/Stucki (1990) for Swiss
markets, and by Puttonen (1993) for Finish markets. Several of these papers report
that the absolute value of the undelValuation of futures decreases when markets
mature and even turn into an ovelValuation. For German markets, it is found that the
mispricing is closer to zero in later contracts than in earlier contracts, but that the
av~rage mispricing stays below zero. In contrast to the studies cited above and the
results reported above, Cornell (1985) reports for US markets and Bailey (1989) for
the Japanese markets that there are on average no significant deviations of futures
prices from their fair values. Even more contrary to the results presented here,
Bhatt/Cakici (1990) find on average a small premium in. futures prices for US
markets, which occurs more often infutures with longertime to maturity.
Mixed results have b~en found concerning the relation between time to maturity and
mispricing offutures. On the one hand, Yadav/Pope (1990) report that the absolute
size of undelValuation of futures increases significantly with time to maturity for
most ofthe contracts at the beginning of the research period while later the effect is
insignificant or shows the opposite sign. Similar to Yadav/Pope (1990),
MacKinlay/Ramaswamy (1988) recognize a positive effectoftime to maturity on the
absolute value of the mispricing. On the other hand, neither Lim (1992) nor
BrennerlSubrahmanyamlUno (1989) find a significant relation between mispricing
and time to maturity. Contrary to these studies, in German markets a persistent trend
of an increasing size of undelValuation with time to maturity is found. Neither the
size of the regression parameter b, nor the explanatory power of the regressions
change consistently overtime.
6. Arbitrage
In Section 5, it is shown that the cost-of-carry model is unable to describe the
obselVed relationship between futures and spot market prices. However, this still
leaves open the question of whether the mispricing is large enough for arbitrageurs
16to earn profits when they are obliged to pay transaction costs. This question is
addressed in the remainderofthis paper.
A typ~cal two step approach is used in order to simulate an arbitrage strategy. First,
specific arbitrage signals are detennined. Second, taking into account the execution
lag, the profits from anex ante arbitrage strategy based on these arbitrage signals are
studied.
6.1. Arbitrage Signals
Transaction costs are an important factor detennining the no arbitrage windows
within which arbitrageurs are not willing to trade. In general transaction costs, and
consequently, the no arbitrage windows, are not of the same size for different
investors. In this paper, arbitrage opportunities of the investor with the smallest no
arbitrage window, subsequently called the low cost arbitrageur, are studied. In
Gennany institutional investors, like commercial and investment banks, can be
identified as low costs arbitrageurs. Therefore, the transaction costs of this group of
investors will be subsequently deten'nined. Itis essential for arbitrage studies that the
level of these costs are accurately detennined as the results from arbitrage studies
are very sensitive to this specification.
There are in general five elements of transaction costs, namely brokerage fees,
settlement fees, stock lending fees, the bid ask spread, and market impact costs. The
costs associated with the fonner two are specified in Section 2. One way transaction
costs are 0.06 % ofthe trade size in the stock market and 4 DM perfutures contract.
Settlement fees to be paid to the Deutsche Kassenverein are 0.7 DM per trade in the
spot market - i.e. 21 DM when trading the index portfolio.
There are costs of borrowing stocks when the arbitrage strategy requires short
selling of stocks. As a,low cost arbitrageur is assumed to belong to a bank, he may
borrow stocks from an in-house securities lending desk or from the Deutsche
Kassenverein lending system. In general, the borrowing'"rates are significantly
smaller when the in-house system is used. Therefore, it ~s assumed that an
arbitrageur borrows the stock portfolio needed from an in-house securities lending
desk. Unfortunately, data ofin-house borrowing rates are not available ona frequent
17basis. They are supplied to the authors for six points of time in 1991 and 1992 by a
large Gennan commercial bank. The levels of borrowing rates are decreasing over
the period of time under investigation, ranging from 2.5 percent per year at the
beginning of 1991 to 0.75 percent per year at the end of 1992. Borrowing rates at
points oftime where no data are available are computed by linear interpolation ofthe
two closest borrowing rates.
An explicit spread is quoted in the futures market but not in the stock market. When
opening a futures position in a long orshort arbitrage strategy the bid or ask price of
the futures is considered. As the futures is settled at the spot price at maturity day T
no spread in the futures market has to be taken into account when closing an
arbitrage position. No bid ask spreads are quoted in the stock market by official
brokers. However, there may be an effective bid ask spread in that market as
suggested by Roll (1984). Haller/Stoll (1989) estimate this effective spread in
Gennan stock prices using the model of Roll (1984). They report that the spread is
not significantly difft.rent from zero when trading large stocks. Therefore no spread
intrading stocks is considered inthis study.
An arbitrageur is able to trade a known number offutures at the bid or ask quote, in
general five orten contracts. Inthe trading strategy analyzed in the remainder ofthis
paper it is assumed that the arbitrageur is trading one futures contract when
observing an arbitrage signal. Therefore, no market impact costs in the futures
madcet have to be considered.As the stocks included in the DAX are very liquid it is
assumed in addition that the opening and closing of an arbitrage position has no
price impact onthe individual stocks inthe DAX.
Using the data described above, round trip transaction costs for trading one arbitrage
position are approximated in the following way. It is assumed that round trip
transaction fees are 0.12 percent ofthe current trading volume in the spot market (in
DM). They have to be paid when the arbitrage position is build up. Trading costs
resulting from the portfolio adjustment due to dividend payments are neglected.
Furthermore, it is assumed that arbitrageurs have to borrow stocks when they want
to sell them. This assumption insures that the no arbitrage window does not depend
on the number of stocks bought by the arbitrageur in the past. Therefore, the no
arbitrage window is independent of the former arbitrage behaviour. Putting
18everything together, one unit short arbitrage (sell stocks, buy one future) results in
transaction costs




» +Bs[T- t]* DAX (t) *100
and one unit long arbitrage yields transaction costs C(t,Tl ofthe following size:
(6) C(t,Tl=0.12*DAX(t)+(21 +4)*(1+ e-r(T-/»,
where DAX(t) is the index value. One futures contract represents a trading volume of
100 DM - Le. $ 62.5 per index point. Bs*[T-t]*DAX(t)*100 are the borrowing costs
when selling a comparable stock portfolio short for the period of time T-t.
0.12*DAX(t) are the round trip transaction fees for trading this stock portfolio, and
(21+ 4)(1+ e-r(T-I» represents the present value ofthe round trip stock settlement fees
and transaction fees of trading one futures contract. A rough calculation yields that
the total transaction costs ofa long arbitrage position are about 0.125 percent of the
value of the stock portfolio. The transaction costs of a short arbitrage position are
larger and depend heavily, due to the stock lending fee, onthe time to maturity ofthe
futures contract. Fora futures contract with 90 days until maturity, this lending fee is
between 0.1875 percent of the value of the stock portfolio at the end of 1992 and
0.625 percent at the beginning of 1991. The bid ask spread is ,considered by using
the bidorthe ask price in the arbitrage signals (7) and (8).
Transaction costs define the minimum size of the no arbitrage window. However,
based on interviews with market participants, it is assumed in this study that
arbitrageurs are willing to trade only if, in addition to transaction costs, a required
risk premium, RP, is covered by the mispricing. This risk premium is taken as four
index points, which is the lowest level specified by an arbitrageur. Given an index
value of 1600 index points, which was the average level of the DAX index in 1991
and 1992, four index points equal 0.25 percent of the index value. Thus, the risk
premium is even larger than the transaction costs associated with a long arbitrage
strategy.
When analyzing the profitability ofarbitrage strategies, the relevant bid or ask quote
for the futures price and interest rates are used to calculate the mispricing. The
relative mispricing in determining a long (short) arbitrage signal, RMlSL(RMlSs), is
19computed using the ask (bid) interest rate and the bid (ask) futures quote. A long
arbitrage signal is observedif
(7) RMIS(t T)L > C(t,T)L +RP*100
, DAX(t)*lOO'
and a short arbitrage signal if:
(8) -RMIS(t,T)S> C(t,T)s+RP*l00.
DAX(t)*l00
Note that the no arbitrage window is not symmetric around zero, but larger at




and the size ofa short arbitrage signal as
(10) -RMIS(t,T)s C(t,T)s+RP*l00•
DAX(t)*l00
Table ill shows the average number and size of arbitrage signals for total time to
maturity and for the period of time when the contract is neare~t to delivery. There
are a large number of arbitrage signals, most of them indicating a short arbitrage
opportunity (SAS). Long arbitrage signals (LAS) are observed very rarely and occur
in nearly all cases during the subperiod when the future is the contract nearest to
delivery. In tenns of absolute numbers, the predominance of short arbitrage signals
is not surprising since most of the futures are undervalued (see Table I). Even after
controlling for the different frequencies of positive and negative mispricings, Table
ill indicates still relatively more short arbitrage signals than long"arbitrage signals.
The ratio of the number of short (long) arbitrage signals and undervalued futures is
denoted by SAS (LAS) ratio. For example, it can be seen that 27.6 percent of all
undervalued futures with maturity in September' 1991 provide a short arbitrage
signal, while only 0.2 percent of the overvalued futures provide a long arbitrage
signal.
20Tableill: Signals Indicating Long Arbitrage orShortArbitrage Opportunities:
Total Time to Maturity / Futures to Delivery
(
Contract T=03/91 T=06/91 T=09/91 T=12/91 T=03/92 T=06/92 T=09/92 T=12/92
SASNo 2799/1578 7235/886 6654/150 1540/0 1033/318 7729/133 7329/3 4705/18
SAS Size (%) 0.29/0.36 0.45/0.06 0.48/0.08 0.07/0 0.04/0.04 0.15/0.03 0.23/0.14 0.25/0.05
LAS No 10/10 0/0 2/2 1/0 0/0 0/0 5/5 0/0
LAS Size (%) 0.10 / 0.10 0/0 0.29/0.29 0.02/0 0/0 0/0 0.06/0.06 0/0
Si~nalRatio (%) 27.5/20.8 37.1/10.6 26.6/1.8 6.3/0 4.7/4.6 37.8/2.1 33.4 /0.0 19.2/0.2
SAS Ratio (%) 31.5/25.1 38.7/10.3 27.6/2.0 6.4/0 5.0/5.6 40.7/2.6 40.5/0.1 22.8/0.3
LAS Ratio (%) 0.8/0.8 0/0 0.2/0.2 0.2/0 0/0 0/0 0.1/0.1 0/0
Subsequent SAS 16.1 / 18.3 18.0/4.4 14.7/3.1 5.1/0 3.8/4.2 24.4 / 3.0 31.3/3 92.3/1.8









Maturity ofthe futures contract;
Number of signals indicating short arbitrage opportunities;
Average size ofshort arbitrage signals;
Number ofsignals indicating long arbitrage opportunities;
Average size of-long arbitrage signals;
Total number ofarbitrage signals relative to the total number ofmispricings;
Number ofsignals that indicate short arbitrage opportunities relative to the number ofobserved undervalued futures;
Number ofsignals that indicate long arbitrage opportunities relative to the number ofobserved overvalued futures;There are more arbitrage signals when futures are not nearest to delivery than during
the period of time when they are nearest to -delivery. The results for futures not
nearest to delivery are not explicitly shown in the table, but they can easily be
calculated from the numbers provided. For example, consider the futures contract
maturing in September 1991. There are 152 arbitrage signals (150 SAS + 2 LAS)
when it is the nearest contract, and 6656-152=6504 arbitrage signals when it is not
the contract nearest to delivery. The arbitrage signals in the nearest to delivery
period relate to 8381 mispriced futures in that period (see Table I) yielding a signal
ratio of 1.8 percent. In this subperiod, only 1.8 percent of all mispriced futures with
maturity September 1991 provide an arbitrage signal. Over total time to maturity this
ratio is 26.6 percent. From these numbers it follows that the signal ratio in that
contract is 39.2 percent for the period of time when it is not the contract nearest to
delivery. In this subperiod, more than one out of three futures quotes provide an
arbitrage signal, althoughthe no arbitrage window widens with time to maturity.
The average size of ~hort arbitrage signals is in most contracts much smaller for the
nearest to delivery subperiod than for total time to maturity. In the SEP91 futures
contract, the average short arbitrage signal is 0.48 percent for total time to maturity
and only 0.08 percent for the period oftime when it is nearest to delivery. From that
result, one might suspect that arbitrageurs concentrate in trading futures nearest to
delivery and prevent prices from deviating far from the no arbitrage window as
defined byequations (7) and (8).
Ifarbitrageurs trade actively in the way described above, arbitrage signals should be
exploited quickly forcing the mispricing back into the no arbitrage window.
Therefore, the number of subsequent arbitrage signals is an indicator for the
unobservable trading activity of arbitrageurs. Table ill shows that on average more
subsequent short arbitrage signals occur in most contracts during the period of time
when they are not nearest to delivery.!0 This result suggests that arbitrageurs
respond less to arbitrage signals in futures not nearest to delivery than in futures
nearest to delivery. This finding is consistent with theoretic~ results of Holden
(1990). He shows that the optimal trading strategy of a non-competitive arbitrageur
depends on time to maturity since the arbitrageur considers the impact of current
arbitrage trading onfuture arbitrage opportunities.
10 As there are onlyafew long arbitrage signals, they are notdiscussed in detail. The numbers
are shown in tablem.
22When comparing different futures contracts, it is remarkable that the numbers of
subsequent arbitrage signals after March 1992 are high in futures not nearest to
delivery and low in futures nearest to delivery. This suggests a stronger
concentration effect - compared to earlier contracts -on futures nearest to delivery.
6.2. Ex Ante Arbitrage Profitability
In this section, the profitability of an ex ante arbitrage strategy conditional on
arbitrage signals is studied. It is assumed that an arbitrageur behaves according to
the following strategy. The arbitrageur places orders at the spot and futures markets
whenever an arbitrage signal is observed. The futures market order is executed
without delay, and the spot market transaction is executed with an order execution
lag. The length of the order execution lag at the spot market is specified by most
arbitrageurs at one to two minutes. However, execution lags ranging from one to 15
minutes are considered. Order execution lags of this length are incorporated in the
study in orderto test the sensitivity ofthe results to the execution lag.
Table N presents the results of an arbitrage strategy conditional on short arbitrage
signals. The case of long arbitrage signals is not pursued further since only a few
long arbitrage signals are observed. The result of a short arbitrage strategy,
conditional on the existence ofa short arbitrage signal, is given as
where t is the point of time at which a short arbitrage signal is observed and the
futures market trade is executed. ; is the point of time at which the spot market
order is executed. ; and t differ by the order execution lag. Note that the risk
premium has an impact only on the arbitrage signal, butnot on the arbitrage profit.
23TableN: Ex Ante Short Arbitrage Profits: Total Time to MaturityI Futures Nearest to Delivery
Contract T=03/91 T=06/91 T=09/91 T=12/91 T=03/92 T=06/92 T=09/92 T=12/92
SAS 2799/1578 7235/886 6654/150 1540/0 1033/318 7729/133 7329/3 4705/18
SA (1) (%) 100/100 100/100 100/100 100i- 100/100 100/100 100/100 100/100
SA (2) (%) 100/100 100/100 100/98.7 99.9/- 100/100 100/100 100/100 100/100
SA (5) (%) 99.6/99.5 99.6/99.2 99.5/94.7 98.9/- 98.6/99.7 99.6/100 99.5/100 99.3/94.4
SA (10) (%) 96.3/96.4 96.5/93.8 96.6/86.7 95.2/- 94.1/95.3 96.6/96.2 96.8/100 96.9/100
SA (15) (%) 93.3/94.1 93.0/88.6 92.9/82.7 91.5/- 90.8/90.1 93.6/90.2 94.1/100 94.4 / 94.4
PSA (1)(%) 0.69/0.76 0.87/0.36 0.88/0.37 0.41/- 0.35/0.3i 0.47/0.29 0.53/0.48 0.55/0.36
PSA (2) (%) 0.69/0.76 0.87/0.35 0.88/0.33 0.40/- 0.34/0.30 0.46/0.28 0.53/0.44 0.55/0.31
PSA (5) (%) 0.68/0.76 0.86/0.34 0.88/0.26 0.38/- 0.32/0.29 0.46/0.27 0.53/0.63 0.55/0.27
PSA (10) (%) 0.66/0.74 0.83/0.31 0.85/0.20 0.36/- 0.29/0.26 0.45/0.24 0.51/0.96 0.54/0.34
PSA (15) (%) 0.65/0.73 0.81/0.30 0.83/0.18 0.34/- 0.27/0.26 0.43/0.22 0.50/0.92 0.52/0.31
TPSA (1) (1000 $) 1688/1031 5611 /316 5215/53 631/0 367/104 3672/41 4150/1 2814/6
TPSA (2) (1000 $) 1684/1029 5605/311 5206/49 621/0 357/102 3668/41 4146/1 2814/5
TPSA (5) (1000 $) 1670/1019 5567/298 5165/38 592/0 332/96 3640 /39 4117/2 2798/4
TPSA (10) (1000 $) 1618/992 5393/277 5019/30 554/0 304/88 3523/34 3991/3 2736/5






Maturity ofthe futures contract;
Number ofshort arbitrage signals;
Number ofsuccessful short arbitrage trades with a lag of i minutes relative to the number ofshort arbitrage signals;
Average size ofarbitrage profit with a lag ofi minutes relative to the index value;
Total arbitrage profit with a lag of i minutes;It is shown in Table IV that all short arbitrage signals result in an arbitrage profit
when the spot order is executed after a delay ofone minute. Arbitrage trading is risk
free when the spot market order is executed within such a short period of time.
Increasing the length of the execution lag in the spot market leads, as expected, to a
reduction of the success ratio. This result is found for total time to maturity and
during the subperiod when the futures are the contracts nearest to delivery. I I
Arbitrage trading is more risky the longer it takes to build up the spot position. Since
the futures position is built up without delay, this finding suggests that the spot
market moves on average in such a manner that arbitrage profits decrease. The level
ofmispricing seems to have an impact on the future spot price movement.
The success ratios found in this study are much larger than those reported by Chung
(1991) for the US-market. In his study, even with an execution lag of only 20
seconds, less than 92 % percent ofall arbitrage trades are profitable. The differences
in results can mainly be attributed to the different trading strategies studied. While in
this study arbitrage trading starts when the mispricing exceeds the transaction costs
by more than a risk premium requited, Chung (1991) assumes. that arbitrageurs do
always trade whenever the mispricing exceeds transaction costs.
The average size of arbitrage profits relative to the value of the stock portfolio,
DAX(i)*l00, is denoted by PSA in Table IV. It is positive in all cases, which shows
that the losses suffered by the arbitrage strategy are smaller than the arbitrage
profits. Comparing the values of PSA with the size of the short arbitrage signals
shown in Table ill, it is found that the average arbitrage profit is larger than the
arbitrage signal, even at an execution lag of 15 minutes. This suggests that the
market participants overstate the execution risk and demand a risk premium larger
than necessary to coverthat risk.
Finally, Table IV shows the total arbitrage profit of an arbitrageur who opens one
arbitrage position whenever an arbitrage signal is observed. The ex ante arbitrage
profit is detennined by the number of arbitrage signals as well as by the arbitrage
11 Due to the small numbers of short arbitrage signals, the futures contracts nearest to
delivery with maturity in December 1991, September 1992, and December 1992 are not
discussed when analyzing the success ratio, SA, and the average arbitrage profit, PSA.
25profit resulting from each transaction. These results exhibit two characteristics First,
arbitrageurs trading according to the strategy specified above earn high arbitrage
profits in most contracts. Second, large arbitrage profits can mostly be realized in
futures contracts during the period oftime when they are not the contracts nearest to
delivery. However, this finding also suggests that most arbitrageurs concentrate on
futures nearest to delivery. Infutures nearest to delivery large arbitrage profits occur
only in the first two contracts suggesting that the futures market exhibits a
maturation effect. But, this maturation effect is only found in futures nearest to
delivery.
7. Summary
The paper contains the results of a study of the price relation between the German
stock performance index, DAX, and DAX futures. It is shown that for these markets
there is no dividend risk for an arbitrageur. The execution risk in the spot market is
considered in the arbitrage strategy by taking a risk premium into account. The
relative mispricing has to exceed round trip transaction costs plus the risk premium
before arbitrageurs are willing to trade.
The main results of this paper are the following. First, it is found that the relation
betweenindex andfutures prices cannotbe described by the model ofcash and carry
arbitrage. Futures contracts are significantly undetvalued. This finding is similar to
results reported from other markets. The absolute value of the undetvaluation
increases in all contracts with time to maturity. Second, there are a large number of
arbitrage signals - most indicating short arbitrage oppo~ties. This is true
particularly for futures contracts which are not nearest to delivery. Third, arbitrage
signals disappear quickly in futures when they are the contracts,with shortest time to
maturity. This suggests that arbitrageurs exploit arbitrage signals rapidly, but only in
the nearest contracts. Fourth, there is very limited risk associated with the simulated
arbitrage strategy. With a reasonable order execution lag, more than 95 % of all
arbitrage trades are profitable. Finally, with the exception of ~e first half of 1991,
the total arbitrage profit of an arbitrageur is low when trading in futures nearest to
delivery. Itis much larger when trading in futures which are not nearest to delivery.
26As one might suspect that arbitrageurs determine the mispricing by their trading
strategies, this result suggests that arbitrageurs concentrate their trading on futures
nearest to delivery.
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